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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1896 
 ___________ 
 
 JAMES S. STRINGER, 




THE PITTSBURGH POLICE; OFFICER DAVID SISAK;  
JOHN DOE POLICE OFFICERS 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-01051) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 26, 2010 
 
 Before:  BARRY, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 








 James S. Stringer appeals pro se from the District Court‟s order entering summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 In November 2006, Pittsburgh police officer David Sisak stopped Stringer‟s car 
after running his license plate and learning that it was registered to a different vehicle.  
Sisak questioned Stringer and ultimately arrested him for displaying a counterfeit license 
plate in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 7122(3).  Stringer spent 12 days in jail, some part of 
which resulted from a subsequently discovered detainer.  He later produced paperwork 
demonstrating that he had properly transferred the license plate from an older car to the 
one he was driving, and the charge against him was dismissed. 
 Stringer then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Sisak, the 
Pittsburgh police department, and “John Doe” police officers.  Stringer (who is African-
American) alleged wrongful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, racial profiling 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution 
under Pennsylvania law.  Stringer filed his complaint through counsel, but counsel later 
withdrew and Stringer proceeded pro se.  The defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment on Stringer‟s federal claims, which Stringer opposed.  Stringer also filed a 
motion to amend his complaint to add the City of Pittsburgh and several of its employees 
as defendants.   
By order entered February 25, 2010, the District Court: (1) entered summary 
judgment in favor of Officer Sisak and the City (which it construed Stringer to have 
named by naming the police department) on Stringer‟s federal claims; (2) exercised 
supplemental jurisdiction over Stringer‟s state-law claims and sua sponte entered 
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summary judgment in favor of the defendants on those claims as well; and (3) denied 
Stringer‟s motion for leave to amend.  Stringer appeals.1 
II. 
 The District Court concluded that Stringer had not submitted any evidence in 
support of his claims.  Stringer‟s Fourth Amendment claim required him to prove that 
Officer Sisak arrested him without probable cause.  See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 
219 F.3d 261, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2000).  An absence of probable cause is one element of the 
state-law torts of false arrest and malicious prosecution as well.  See Renk v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (false arrest); Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 
1490, 1502 (3d Cir. 1993) (malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law).  Finally, 
Stringer‟s Fourteenth Amendment claim required him to prove that defendants‟ actions 
“(1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”  
Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2002).
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1
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Stringer‟s federal claims pursuant to  
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and his state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the entry 
of summary judgment.  See Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 250 n.12 
(3d Cir. 2010).  “Summary judgment is proper „if the pleadings, the discovery and 
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no dispute as to any 
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‟”  Id. 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).  A plaintiff faced with a properly supported summary 
judgment motion “cannot avert summary judgment by resting on the allegations in his 
pleadings, but rather must present evidence from which a jury could find in his favor.”  
Id.  Stringer has not challenged on appeal the District Court‟s denial of his motion for 
leave to amend, its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims, or 
its consideration of summary judgment on those claims sua sponte.  Nevertheless, we 
perceive no reversible error in those rulings. 
2
 Stringer had to prove additional elements to hold the City of Pittsburgh liable for 
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 The District Court entered summary judgment on these claims because it 
concluded that Stringer had presented no evidence raising a triable issue of fact.  We 
agree that Stringer presented no evidence in support of his Fourteenth Amendment claim, 
and he does not argue otherwise on appeal.  The only substantive question is whether he 
presented evidence sufficient to raise an inference that Officer Sisak arrested him without 
probable cause.  In support of defendants‟ summary judgment motion, Officer Sisak 
submitted an affidavit stating, inter alia, that he arrested Stringer after discovering the 
discrepancy with the license plate because Stringer was unable to produce a temporary 
registration authorizing its transfer to the vehicle he was driving.  Stringer argues that he 
in fact showed Officer Sisak the temporary registration and that the parties‟ dispute on 
this point creates a genuine issue for trial.   
We will assume without deciding that Stringer‟s contention that he showed Officer 
Sisak a proper temporary registration would have raised a triable issue of fact if he had 
supported it with evidence at the summary judgment stage.  Stringer, however, cited no 
such evidence in the District Court and cites none on appeal.  Stringer took no discovery.  
He also did not submit an affidavit setting forth his own version of events, as even pro se 
prisoners are expected to do.  See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Stringer‟s responses to defendants‟ interrogatories are of record because the defendants 
submitted them, but, as they argue, Stringer admitted in those responses that “I will 
                                                                                                                                                             
any violation by Officer Sisak, see Berg, 219 F.3d at 275-76, but Stringer has raised 
no issue of municipal liability on appeal and we agree with the District Court that he 
was not entitled to proceed with his claims against Officer Sisak in any event.  
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accept that [Officer Sisak] had the legal authority to arrest me as he did[.]”  (Dist. Ct. 
Docket No. 25-2 at 11 ¶ 6.)  Stringer did not argue in the District Court that his 
interrogatory responses otherwise support his claim and has not so argued on appeal.  
Instead, the only item of evidence that Stringer cites in support of this argument is a copy 
of the temporary registration itself.  The registration itself, however, is not probative of 
whether Stringer showed it to Officer Sisak at the time of his arrest.  Stringer also argues 
that he specifically disputed Officer Sisak‟s account in his own statement of facts.  That 
is true, but Stringer‟s statement “is not evidence.”  Doeblers‟ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. 
Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006).   
Stringer‟s only remaining argument on appeal is that the District Court improperly 
held his summary judgment response to the same standard as a response by a trained 
litigant.  In entering summary judgment, the District Court deemed defendants‟ statement 
of facts undisputed because Stringer, in his own statement, did not admit or deny 
defendants‟ averments on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis or cite evidence of record in 
support of his own averments as he was required to do by both court order (Dist. Ct. 
Docket No. 20) and local rule (W.D. Pa. R. 56.(c)(1)).  We find no reversible error in this 
regard.  Although the District Court initially stated that it would deem defendants‟ 
statement of facts undisputed for these reasons, it nevertheless went on to “carefully 
review[] the entire record for evidence, in deference to plaintiff‟s pro se status.”  (Dist. 
Ct. Docket No. 40 at 16.)  The District Court evidently located no evidence calling 
Officer Sisak‟s account into question, and Stringer has cited none on appeal.   
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We sympathize with Stringer for having experienced what were serious and no 
doubt troubling events.  Because he did not come forward with evidence in support of his 
claims, however, we have no basis to disturb the District Court‟s entry of summary 
judgment.  Accordilly, we will affirm.
